The statute · the Texas menu

Eight levers. Dell pulls five.

Texas did not impose a uniform regime; it built a menu. Two effects arrive by operation of law — a codified business-judgment rule for exchange-listed corporations and Business Court jurisdiction over internal-entity claims. The consequential provisions are opt-in, and each requires a charter or bylaw choice. Dell makes affirmative elections of the eight; ExxonMobil made zero.

By operation of law

Two effects arrive automatically — no election required.

Codified business-judgment rule

Applies automatically to corporations with voting shares listed on a national securities exchange (and to others that elect in). Dell, exchange-listed, is covered by default and makes an express §21.419 election in Annex E.

Business Court jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over internal-entity claims, paired with Tex. Gov’t Code §25A.004(d) venue. Dell layers an affirmative exclusive-forum waterfall on top (Art. XIII).

The two filings, side by side

The same destination, two opposite packages.

Each row cites the operative TBOC section. Dell’s elections are itemized in its Texas Charter, Annex E (and, for §21.373, by board-intended bylaw). ExxonMobil’s posture is blanket non-adoption.

Elective leverDell (DE→TX)ExxonMobil (NJ→TX)
1 · §21.552 derivative-standing 3% floorElects charter-created 3% of outstanding (Art. XVI)Declined
2 · §21.419 business-judgment-rule electionElects affirmatively (Art. X)By default (exchange-listed); not separately elected
3 · §2.115 jury-trial waiverElects for internal-entity claims (Art. XIV)Declined
4 · Officer + director exculpation (SB 2411)Elects fullest extent permitted by the TBOC (Art. X)Limited baseline; no affirmative expansion
5 · Exclusive-forum waterfallElects Business Court → 3rd BC Div. → W.D. Tex. → Travis Cty. (Art. XIII)Texas-courts clause only
6 · §21.606 anti-takeover moratoriumOpts out (Art. XV; mirrors prior DGCL §203 opt-out)Not disclosed
7 · §21.373 shareholder-proposal thresholdBoard-intended (post-conversion bylaw)Declined
8 · §21.4161 independent-director determinationLeft available (panel-determination, not locked)Not adopted
What the table shows. Dell makes affirmative elections (rows 1–5), opts out of one moratorium (row 6), plans one by bylaw (row 7), and leaves one available (row 8). ExxonMobil’s column is blank across the elective rows — the same statute, the opposite charter.
Source note. Dell elections: DEF 14A Annex E (Texas Charter). ExxonMobil posture: its DEF 14A states it is “not adopting any elective provisions of the Texas corporate statute that weaken shareholder rights as compared to New Jersey law.” The §21.419 default-vs-election distinction is preserved deliberately: Dell is covered by default and elects expressly.

The two thresholds do different work

One narrows who can litigate; the other sets a dollar floor on who can propose.

The two thresholds are not symmetrical. The derivative-standing threshold under TBOC §21.552(a)(3) caps at 3% of outstanding shares, with grouping permitted — the courthouse door. At Dell’s scale that is shares (0.03 × total shares as of ), roughly of the public Class C float.

The proposal-submission threshold under TBOC §21.373 (added by SB 1057) is structured differently: the lesser of $1 million in market value or 3% of voting shares, held for six months, with 67% solicitation. For any issuer above roughly $33 million in equity value the $1 million prong controls and the 3% prong never bites; at Fortune 500 scale it is a procedural filter, not a structural one. One narrows who can litigate. The other sets a dollar floor on who can submit a ballot proposal.

The precedent the 3% floor relies on

Gusinsky v. Reynolds shows the 3% floor screens a 100-share plaintiff — when a corporation elects it.

Gusinsky v. Reynolds, No. 3:25-cv-01816-K (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2026) (Kinkeade, J.) is a Southwest Airlines SB-29 case. Dell is not a party; it is cited only as precedent that an elected 3% floor is enforceable.

1

The precedent

The floor is enforceable when elected

The Northern District of Texas dismissed a Southwest Airlines derivative suit with prejudice when the plaintiff’s 100 shares fell far below Southwest’s bylaw-adopted 3% threshold under §21.552(a)(3).

2

Dell’s charter

Dell elects the same floor

Dell’s Texas Charter (Art. XVI) creates the 3% derivative-standing floor by election — shares at current scale. The architecture Gusinsky enforces is the architecture Dell adopts.

3

The limit

Analogy, not application

Gusinsky governs Southwest Airlines, not Dell. It is the doctrinal predicate showing the elected floor operates as written; it is not a holding about Dell’s charter, which goes to a vote on .

The mechanism

How the move is executed.

The redomestication proceeds as a plan of conversion under DGCL §266 and TBOC Title 1, ch. 10, subch. C. The annual meeting is ; the record date is . Delaware does not stand still — the March 2025 DGCL amendments (SB 21) added a statutory safe harbor for interested-director and controlling-stockholder transactions, and Dell’s Evaluation Committee considered them and still recommended Texas.

Primary statutes. TBOC ch. 21 (§§21.373, 21.419, 21.552, 21.606, 21.4161); TBOC §2.115 (governing-document forum); TBOC ch. 10, subch. C (conversion); DGCL §266 (conversion); DGCL §203 (the moratorium Dell’s prior charter opted out of, mirrored by its §21.606 opt-out).